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Russia's Military Policy 
By COL. GENERAL D.I. VOLKOGONOV
Military Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation
[Editor's note: General Volkogonov also serves as chairman of the State Commission on 
Doctrine and Formation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.]
The dramatic changes that have occurred throughout the territory of the former USSR 
necessarily have had major military implications. On the territory of what had been a 
mighty military power there are now a dozen states which are trying to preserve some 
links between one another and at the same time to divide up one of the largest armies 
in the world in a way that is as advantageous as possible for each state. This is turning 
out to be not only difficult to achieve, but also dangerous for these new states and for 
the entire world community. The former Soviet armed forces possess large quantities of 
nuclear weapons which are deployed on the territory of four of the former Soviet 
republics. Russia is now obliged to define its own military policy in accordance with the 
new situation that has arisen.
The Russian government displayed great restraint over the question of the former 
USSR united armed forces, since it did not want to be a pioneer in the creation of its 
own Russian national armed forces. It fought for a long time to preserve a united army 
and navy of the Commonwealth of Independent States. When this attempt failed, 
Russia fought to ensure that at least a portion of the former Soviet armed forces 
remained unified. However, after Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Uzbekistan decided to set up their own armed forces, it became clear that Russia had 
no alternative but to create its own national forces.
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The President of Russia set up a State Commission charged with developing plans for 
structuring the armed forces and defining a military doctrine for the Russian state 
(rossiiskoe gosudarstvo), and with submitting draft policy decisions. On the basis of 
parliamentary debates and the corresponding resolutions, the commission succeeded in 
accomplishing substantial work over a limited period of time. As a result, a number of 
principles for Russia's future military policy were established and the necessary 
organizational measures were undertaken.
On May 7, President Boris Yel'tsin signed a decree under which all units, formations, 
military schools and other defense facilities located on Russian territory were declared 
to be part of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. In addition, forces still 
stationed in Germany, Poland, Cuba, Mongolia, the Baltic Region, and in some 
commonwealth republics are included in the Russian Federation forces. In total, this 
represents an extremely large force strength of about 2,500,000 men. It is quite evident 
that Russia does not require such a large army for a number of different reasons, 
including a great reduction in the military threat and the country's limited economic 
ability to maintain military forces. However, the principal reason is the new policy that 
the Russian state has adopted and intends to pursue in the future.
From the outset, Russia initiated proposals for the conclusion of a defense treaty with 
the other republics of the former Soviet Union. Ultimately this treaty was signed by six 
republics. However, this security alliance remains open to membership by all the partner 
states of the commonwealth. In order to benefit from other countries' experience in 
combining their forces to ensure mutual security, Russian parliamentarians and military 
officials regularly visit NATO facilities in Brussels and elsewhere. On several occasions, 
the Russian government has declared itself ready to participate in the construction of a 
global security system. It would seem appropriate that at this stage such discussions be 
conducted by highly qualified specialists such as political scientists, engineers, and 
military experts.
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Nuclear issues occupy a special place in Russian military policy. The Russian 
Federation, as the legal successor to the USSR, has decided to pursue a most vigorous 
policy of nuclear disarmament. I had occasion to be present at the meeting between 
President Yel'tsin and President Bush at Camp David during which cuts in nuclear 
weapons were among the topics discussed. I was particularly impressed by the 
determination of both presidents to ensure progress toward a more stable and secure 
world, including a rapid rate of nuclear disarmament.
There can be no question of the strength of the political will with which the Russian 
government is approaching this issue. The only difficulties are of an economic and 
financial nature. The destruction of nuclear arsenals involves great costs. Russia hopes 
that the community partner states concerned, i.e., Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, 
will sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as states which are moving toward a 
nuclear-free status within a strictly defined time frame. It seems that this would be in the 
interests of these sovereign states, as well as of the entire world community. It is 
Russia's hope that, on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Russia alone will retain 
nuclear weapons. It is of course on Russian territory that these monstrous instruments 
of destruction are produced. Russia intends to make radical cuts in its nuclear arsenal 
and progressively make even deeper reductions over time on an internationally agreed 
basis. At the same time, reliable controls to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear 
technology and materials are of the highest importance.
Another important plank in Russia's military policy is its plan to create its own forces 
while simultaneously carrying out profound reforms of the military. What are the 
essential features of these reforms?
The first objective is to carry out major reductions in the size of the armed forces, with 
the result that over the next three to four years they will be cut to a maximum level of 
1,500,000 men. In later years the numbers may be reduced even further. The reforms 
will involve changes in relationships between different types of forces and the different 
services with a view to the radical reduction of offensive capabilities. The political 
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organs in the army and navy have been abolished outright. The system of military 
recruitment will be changed as the result of the progressive move from a conscription-
based system to a contractual system, in conjunction with other reforms.
Naturally, the reform planners are faced with major economic and social problems. For 
example, currently there are 198,000 officers stationed in Russia who are without 
housing. After the completion of force withdrawals from other regions this number may 
rise to 260,000. The president and the Russian government are currently seeking 
additional funding for large-scale construction of accommodation as well as subsidies 
for the purchase of housing by servicemen who are retired from the armed forces. For 
the first time since 1917, expenditure for the social welfare of military personnel 
comprises over one-half the Russian military budget. Courses are being set up for 
former servicemen in entrepreneurship, business, and marketing. In other words, social 
questions effectively occupy a key place in the reforms being initiated in the Russian 
military.
At the same time, a new Ministry of Defense and a new General Staff are being created. 
Naturally, the size of these institutions will be considerably smaller than was the case in 
the former USSR. A substantial proportion of the best qualified officers currently serving 
in them will find employment within the new structure. However, for the first time civilian 
officials will fill a large number of official posts as a result of the decision that has been 
taken gradually to "demilitarize" the ministry. For example, a 46-year-old academic 
expert, Professor Andrei Kokoshin—who, incidentally, is a prominent specialist on the 
U.S.—has been appointed first deputy minister of defense. Kokoshin has never served 
as a professional military officer.
[For insight into the new first deputy minister's views on supervision of the armed forces 
and on developing miliraty doctrince, please see From the Database] The new minister 
of defense, Army General Pavel Grachev, who until recently held a top command in the 
airborne forces, is similarly young and energetic. Together they are now setting up the 
Russian Ministry of Defense—and they have more than enough work ahead of them.
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In particular, a new military doctrine is being developed. Clearly, the pivotal aspect of 
this doctrine will be the tasks of defending Russia's sovereignty and preventing global 
and local military conflicts in close cooperation with Russia's allies. The army of Russia 
is no longer watching "potential opponents" (to use the old expression) through the 
cross hairs of a gunsight. A new humanistic world view is slowly but irresistibly winning 
over the minds of the officers and men of the Russian military. It is significant that a new 
Russian Army Humanistic Academy (Gumanitarnaya Akademiya Rossiiskoi Armii) has 
been set up to replace the Military-Political Academy. The old corpus of generals has to 
a large extent been retired. In future, the Russian army definitely will be a new and 
younger army.
It is still too early to speak of the success of the new reforms. However, an impressive 
start has been made. The main achievement is that the Russian armed forces are not a 
threat to anyone. The man in Russian uniform finally has been freed of the influence of 
the party. In turn, this is a clear sign that the reforms under way in Russia, however 
agonizing and difficult they may be, ultimately will lead the country out onto the path of 
civilized and democratic development. The basis is already being laid for this future.
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